Jack Straw, the British Foreign Secretary was quite grim in his assessment after a visit to the sub continent and interactions with its congenital foes: the situation was “very dangerous” even though a war has still not become inevitable. Speaking later to Colin Powell, the U.S. Secretary of State, Straw was reportedly of the view that neither side quite grasped the danger of a military conflict, escalating into a nuclear confrontation. Both sides were to maintain the same rhetoric each urging the other for demonstrative action as a prelude to reduction of tension. New Delhi was expecting Islamabad to curb infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir permanently. There were indications that Pakistani President might actually have issued instructions (to the commanders of its 10 Corp, deployed along the Line of Control) to curb infiltration. But signals about the execution of the orders from the ground remained largely “confused” due to logistics involving at least Jaish-e-Mohammad group, though not so difficult in respect of outfits like Lashkar-e-Taiba as it was functioning largely under Pakistan's military control according to reliable sources.[i] That something need to be done was nevertheless becoming increasingly imperative for New Delhi as it was running out of diplomatic options.' Talking on Fox News India's Ambassador to the United States, Lalit Mansingh, said “War can be avoided if Pakistan can be persuaded to switch off terrorism.” War is not an option of our choice. We have been facing a series of terrorist acts. We have lost more than 1,000 people after September 11, and the last attack on May 14 was particularly gruesome when the terrorists went to an Army camp and killed basically women and children. We have diplomatic options and the last choice is military action. For the last six months we have been exercising the diplomatic option. Now we are coming to a stage when we're running out of diplomatic options.”[ii] Thus the list of countries and international organisations advising their diplomatic staff and citizens to leave India gradually swelled with Australia joining the US and UK advising its “non-essential” staff and dependents to leave the country and the United Nations office in New Delhi informing its officials that all family members and dependents would have to leave India by the second week of June. (however Russia, China, Israel, and West Asian countries, apart from recommending their respective foreign ministries to issue travel advisories against their nationals visiting the region, preferred a ‘wait-and-see’ policy before issuing any kind of alarmist signals about a nuclear war in the region. A diplomat was to comment that the United Nations' act of removing its officials in India has sent “panic signals” all over the world. “We don't share that perception yet because the coming week holds out hope. Apart from the Russian President's talks with Indian and Pakistani leaders in Almaty, the visits of US leaders are expected to diffuse the tension.”[iii]

There was a perception however that the west was using the threat of imminent nuclear war between India and Pakistan to pull most of their citizens - embassy staff, businessmen, tourists - out of India, so as to put economic pressure on New Delhi. This fear was also being passed around among the allies so as to make it appear as a common stand against what has now come to be perceived as India’s coercive diplomatic ways. Though it was difficult to know, the fact remained that none of the African missions in Delhi, nor the South-East Asians (save Malaysia), nor Latin America, nor India’s other neighbours, left the country for fear of a nuclear holocaust.[iv]

Nevertheless with passing of each nerve wrecking day, the international community was seeing war clouds in the South Asian horizon.

There was a surfeit of opinion as to what a war at this stage portends for the region as well as for the world. It will be fundamentally different from past wars that India and Pakistan fought and not only because these are now nuclear weapon states. it will be a war with no real political objective on either side. It will be a war of revenge. The western nightmare at this moment, is that this won’t be just another war, but a vicious communal riot with tanks, jets, missiles and nukes.[v] Launching a pre-emptive strike on terrorist camps in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) exposes India to the dangers of pushing the Pakistanis against the wall and risking a nuclear strike. Nuclear weapons have no military purpose. They exist to prevent a conflict from happening. This is the classic deterrence theory. In case of a nuclear confrontation, there is no significance of a second strike capability. In case Pakistan launches a first strike, India’s doctrine of ‘no first use’ becomes redundant because it would already have suffered “unacceptable damage.” Besides there is no cause worthy enough of a nuclear confrontation.[vi] Similar thought were being echoed across the border. Writing in Dawn Khalid Mahmud Arif was arguing; “War, a serious business, will hurt both the countries. Diplomacy deserves international support to subdue passions and promote peace. It is time for good sense, realism, sanity and wisdom to get the better of all policy makers to avert a disaster. Pakistan may keep playing cool. But it takes two to make love or fight. While hoping for the best Pakistan should plan for the worst. Should a war be thrust on this country against its will, those at the helm of affairs must ensure that the loss of any territory is equally matched with a corresponding gain elsewhere.”[vii]

Working up to the Backtrack:

By the end of May, US was finding it difficult to believe that Pakistan has issued instructions to stop infiltration. At “this point, the US is watching the situation very closely to see if it in fact has stopped. We are looking for confirmation of the results on the ground. It is too early to say the cross border infiltration across the Line of Control is stopped.” (State Department spokesman Richard Boucher) Secretary of State Colin Powell had a different assessment that “unfortunately we can still see evidence” that the cross border terrorism was continuing. Announcing his intention to send Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to India and Pakistan to defuse the mounting threat of nuclear war, President Bush also made his strongest demand yet that the Pakistani president, Pervez Musharraf, crack down on the infiltration of terrorists into India. “He must stop the incursions across the Line of Control” in Kashmir, Mr. Bush said at the White House on Thursday morning, using unusually pointed language. “He must do so. We and others are making it clear to him that he must live up to his word.” Not to be cowed down thus, Musharraf began pulling back troops from his country's border with Afghanistan, warning that they would be deployed along the Indian frontier if the Kashmir crisis did not ease. The troops had been on the Afghan border to help US led forces in tracking down Al Qaeda and Taliban forces believed to be on both sides of the frontier. This was to give the White House administration a new cause for concern.[viii] What has however been significant that the White House sought to reject the notion that Musharraf might not be in a position to end cross-border terrorism. “Pakistan has a robust military force, and the ability internally to take action to prevent terrorists from crossing through the line of control,” (Ari Fleischer) But no one was sure, concerned with “a very tense situation” Powell was telling, “I can't tell you how close to a war they might be.” Indications were emerging that Defence Secretary would share US intelligence on the risks of any nuclear gamble that could kill 12 million people immediately and injure another seven million.[ix]

Analysts were putting it across that India's overwhelming military advantage over Pakistan is adding further unpredictability to the standoff between the two countries which could increase the possibility of a war. In military terms, Pakistan is no match for India, which has a 2-to-1 advantage in ground and air forces. At sea, India has an aircraft carrier, while Pakistan has none, and India has more submarines and many more surface warships. The size of both countries' arsenals of deliverable nuclear weapons is secret, but India's is widely believed to be at least twice that of its smaller northern neighbor. This disparity increases uncertainty and contributes to an escalatory situation in which both sides are tempted to take the offensive with preemptive moves, “It's kind of like World War I” according to Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, who watched India and Pakistan take a series of planned escalatory steps in 1999.[x]

The ball so to say lay in Musharraf’s court who Powell said has now given “more positive” assurances that it would stop. India has been asked to show “restraint” until “we can determine whether or nor infiltration activity has ended.” If this (the end of infiltration) could be verified by “everybody,” then New Delhi could be called upon to de-escalate. Detailing a road map Powell said; “1 We are pressing Musharraf very hard to cease all infiltration activities on the part of terrorist organizations across the LoC • 2 We are asking the Indians to show restraint until we can determine whether or not infiltration activity has ended. • 3 If everybody can detect the end of this kind of infiltration activity, then we have a basis for calling upon the Indians to start moving in the other direction, moving down the mobilization ladder• 4 Hopefully, other actions and other steps can be taken after that. • 5 ...There is a sense of urgency, and there are also some issues as to when you actually ... (undertake) such an operation before the monsoon season starts later in the summer.” [xi]

The situation, as an analyst would point out is very much like in middle East. Replace “President Musharraf” with “Yasser Arafat” and replace “across the Line of Control” with “in Israel” and the Washington’s words and deeds seem to be matching those in respect of the Arab-Israeli conflict. But can Bush be more effective in South Asia than he has been in the Middle East? Because both sides are armed with nuclear weapons, the stakes are even higher. In South Asian media, the influence of the world's only superpower is in doubt. In Pakistan's online media, American prodding of Musharraf is frequently resented as heavy handed. In Indian commentary, it is often dismissed as insincere.[xii]

There were signs of toning down a bit from India side as it appears to be pulling back a bit from the brink. “Diplomacy has succeeded in averting a crisis so far,” one senior official said. “I see the possibility of war receding unless there is a major provocation.” But for New Delhi the time frame was important. If India does not act by the end of this month, when the monsoons are expected to begin, military action would then become more complicated.[xiii] To put a sense of credibility to the questions of roll back on infiltrations, the US even offered to be involved in verifying process. “(Pakistan) President Musharraf has said and has pledged that Pakistani territory will not be used for terrorist acts. He has pledged to take steps to ensure that incursions do not happen and that Pakistani territory is not used for terrorist acts or used to originate terrorist acts,” Sean McCormack, Assistant Press Secretary for Foreign Affairs, National Security Council, told reporters here on Monday. “In terms of verifying that incursions have stopped, we will certainly work with the Pakistani government and the Indian Government to determine that these incursions have in fact stopped which is very important. “But it is also important that if there are steps taken on the Pakistani side to de-escalate the situation, that those steps be reciprocated on the Indian side. That is what we are working very closely with the parties right now on.”[xiv]

From Indian point of view, it was as if that key world capitals are indeed capable of making Gen Musharraf walk the talk on terrorism. Preparing to descend on the subcontinent in a couple of days, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage was telling CNN that he would “like to hear again a reiteration from President Musharraf of the fact that nothing is moving across the Line of Control... And I hope that this would be visible both to the United States and India.”[xv]

Washington’s initiative seemed to have been based on a gable of probabilities that India and Pakistan “may well be looking for ways to tamp things down” in a regional crisis which has led to fears of all-out war. “There's no question that when you have two nations that have nuclear weapons and the situation is as it is between India and Pakistan today, that it's a dangerous situation,” but the conflict could be avoided, as both countries would make judgments about what was in their best interests, and they “may well be looking for ways to tamp things down” US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, was telling after a meeting with British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon.)[xvi] The most significant was that, US knew when to urge India to deescalate. “I spoke to President Musharraf over the weekend, once again encouraging him to do everything to restrain all activity across the Line of Control,” Secretary of State Colin Powell was telling in Barbados after a meeting of the Organization of American States. ““When that takes place in a way that is obvious and demonstrable to all, then we would call upon India to take the de-escalatory steps so we can start moving in the other direction.” This was to add to India’s sense of credibility to the Washington’s postures.[xvii]

Armitage visit was the starter with a blunt talk with and detailed demands on Islamabad. “.. the situation is quite complicated and quite volatile” but the meeting (with President Musharraf produced “a good basis on which to proceed. President Musharraf has made it very clear that he is searching for peace and he won't be the one to initiate a war,” Mr. Armitage told reporters, hoping to be able to get the same type of assurances from Delhi.[xviii] At the same time ensuring for New Delhi that the United States would continue efforts to verify that movement by Pakistan-based insurgents into Indian-controlled territory had ceased as Musharraf maintains, [xix] attempting to work out a monitoring mechanism of the Line of Control to permanently prevent infiltration of militants in Jammu and Kashmir.[xx]

By the second week of June, US was able to tell that it has “growing indications that infiltration across the Line of Control “is down significantly” and looked forward to India taking feasible and concrete steps to lower tensions with Pakistan, though details are not forthcoming as yet.[xxi] India took a step forward requesting US to inspect suspected terrorist camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. “In a very informal sense, we have conveyed to the Americans that if they verify the camps are closed, we are going to believe them,” a senior Indian intelligence official was quoted as saying by the Los Angeles Times in a report from New Delhi. However it were as if comments were “a reflection of the Indian government's frustration over what it saw as Washington's failure to make Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf cooperate completely in the war against terrorism.” With the FBI and the CIA agents and US special forces troops already hunting for al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters in Pakistan, it would be logical to visit training camps that Indian intelligence has identified.[xxii] This notwithstanding, India also indicated to respond with moves aimed at demonstrating New Delhi's commitment to peace in the region the latest Musharraf pledge to “stop cross-border infiltration permanently” being seen as a major political gain for India which has insisted on a permanent and irreversible end to terrorist infiltration across the LoC.[xxiii]

High-level international diplomacy in the sub-continent reached a climax with last week’s visit to India and Pakistan by US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. What took place when he was here remains very guarded but there was an assurance that US is more than willing to be the guarantor that Cross- border terrorism does not take place again. Some significant points, besides emerged in public view. Most important is the palpable reduction of the tension with a recession in the possibility of a nuclear war. Thus the diplomatic efforts witnessed in the subcontinent over the last few weeks has had a useful effect and that that this international activity has helped both parties get out of the hole from which neither showed much capacity to extricate itself.[xxiv]

For US the easing of tension however is to allow it to get at the seed of the confrontation - Kashmir. Warning that the Kashmir issue cannot be “allowed to fester for another half century,” the US emphatically said Pakistan must close down terrorist camps and stop infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir. “Pakistan has to stop infiltration across the Line of Control. It means closing down terrorist camps”, said State Department Director of Policy Planning Richard Haass at a joint meeting of the Indo-US Parliamentary Forum, FICCI and Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Stating that the Indo-Pak problem cannot be solved militarily, he said the two countries need to start a dialogue and the US could play a role that can be helpful to India and Pakistan because “I do not think the two countries have reached a point where they, left totally on their own, are able to manage their relationship fully.” “We need to begin to ultimately take steps towards a dramatic improvement in the relationship between India and Pakistan ... or need to make progress gradually towards not only improving the situation on the ground in Kashmir but beginning to deal with the basic difficulty between them over Kashmir.”[xxv]

As part of the easing process, New Delhi decided to lift the ban on over-flights by Pakistani aircraft as one of the CBMs. Islamabad was seen to be responding on trade lines as well by granting duty concession on over 600 items to India and other SAARC countries under the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement. Though this concession is not exclusively for India, the Indian MEA was for welcoming any positive steps by Pakistan. “We are for removal of trade barriers within SAARC countries. We have extended Most Favoured Nation status to Pakistan since the inception of trade relations between the two countries.”[xxvi]

The word of wars and political one up-man ship however was to remain, each side throwing up rhetoric against the other, amidst reports that US deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage was all in praise for Indian democracy as alive and throbbing (“There is a great variety of opinion in the Indian government, as one would expect of a great democracy”). But this comes in the backdrop that, over the past month, a good many Indian leaders have between them displayed a truly breathtaking range of Indian opinion, especially on such everyday matters as war and nuclear deterrence. The Indian Prime Minister’s refutal of Musharraf’s claim that India had been deterred by Pakistan’s nuclear might and that he had been “ready even for a nuclear war”, can be said to be in expected lines. A P J Abdul Kalam the presidential front runner was categorical that deterrence had worked to prevent an Indo-Pak war. Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes was busy denying that India had ever contemplated a strike across the border. He also flip-flopped between seeing no decrease in cross-border terrorism and an actual decrease in it. The Home Minister was expounding on crucial aspects of defence and security. “Lessening of (Indo-Pak) tension is primarily because these great powers have now taken a stand.....Now the word is not from Pakistan but from the leaders of these countries which are leading the global coalition against terrorism. “We will not judge Pakistan any longer by their words.... we will go entirely by what we perceive on the ground.” For an independent observer, it becomes almost apparent that much of the scare regarding a nuclear war emerged from such a bedlam of contradictory statements. [xxvii]

Diplomacy Pays:

New Delhi had two short-term objectives December 2001- military deployment strategy, to make the US war on terrorism incorporate the Kashmir insurgency and to coerce Pakistan into ending its support for terrorist infiltration. A cap on terrorist infiltration until at least the Kashmir assembly polls in October 2002 would serve well. Following the Armitage mission as Washington came to see expressed similarity of purpose in war on terrorism by both the US and India, and extracted a sort of pledge from the Pakistani President, the crisis was to roll down to the level of a confrontation in a manner that appeared in India’s favor.[xxviii] That was to make it easy for New Delhi to take steps toward deescalation, not withstanding the fact that the super power’s assurance was thought to be sufficient and no evidence that cross-border infiltration had been stopped and its infrastructure irreversibly dismantled was needed. the heightened fears of war, even a nuclear exchange, and its adverse impact on business and economy helped ease the process.[xxix]

Thus New Delhi’s well-managed comprehensive strategy produced results on the ground. This was more rewarding especially since there were skepicism aplenty about the efficacy as well as a doubt about a developing country’s ability to do it. Many in India were particularly diffident and weighed down by uncertainties about the country’s own ability to manage the tools of successful statecraft. Coming as it does on the heels of the Kargil war, the valour of the defence forces was well meshed with the work of diplomats by the quality of leadership in all aspects. This was also something that is rooted in history as India did in the 1950s against Pakistan. The process need now to be taken to its logical conclusion with robust counter-measures till the last terrorist is eliminated, surrenders or is converted to non-violence. This also makes a case for free and fair elections in the valley that will take the political and humanitarian processes further providing opportunities for development, empowerment and prosperity for the stake holders and keep New Delhi assured of continued international acquiescence to its policies.[xxx]

The great power inducement to easing of tensions can’t however be precluded. G8, for instance was called on Pakistan to put a stop to extremist groups using the country as a base, while urging it and India to get down to serious talks to end conflict over Kashmir. “We discussed the tensions between India and Pakistan. We agreed that Pakistan must put a permanent stop to terrorist activity originating from territory under its control,” said the communiqué, which released after the end of the two-day Group of Eight summit. The G8 leaders urged the two countries to begin talking peace, saying: “Both countries should commit to sustained dialogue on the underlying issues that divide them.”[xxxi] Husain Haqqani , carried the possibilities further. “Pakistan India and Pakistan have toned down their rhetoric of nuclear war in recent days, but the threat of conflict remains. When they each tested nuclear weapons in 1998, it was hoped that there would be no further wars between them. But since then deterrence has already failed once. The two armies clashed in the high mountain region of Kargil in Kashmir in 1999. After a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December, a million troops have massed on either side of the 3,200-kilometer border between Pakistan and India. Such confrontations have never occurred with this frequency between the world's other nuclear powers. Can deterrence be sustained between India and Pakistan in the way it worked between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War? India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons but do not have in place any of the other elements of deterrence. They do not have clearly identified “red lines,” the crossing of which would result in a nuclear strike. There are no arms control talks, no detailed nuclear doctrines and no telephone hot lines to guard against triggering misperceived or accidental nuclear clashes. Hawks in India think that they can manage a limited war with Pakistan without either side resorting to nuclear arms. Pakistani hard-liners believe that demonstrating the will to use nuclear weapons is important in containing an Indian threat. If the hawks on both sides carry out their threats, India could start a conventional war and Pakistan could take it to the nuclear stage.”[xxxii]

US to Stay:

The Americans are here, no mistaking that, the US is here to mediate. Of course, the Americans will say, as will the Indians, that this is only to ensure the subcontinent doesn’t turn into a nuclear hellhole. And yet, there are enough signals that the US is slowly, but surely, enlarging its role. If in 1999 president Clinton intervened to rollback Kargil, I 2002 Bush and Co shuttled between India and Pakistan, setting out a step-by-step mechanism for restoring peace. Add to this hectic two-way counseling, the presence of American troops in Pakistan and a significant joint US-UK proposal to patrol the Line of Control, and the future begins to look distinctly triangular in that most sacred of all lands: Kashmir. After all, from the LoC to Kashmir is but a short step. In recent months, the official American position has perceptibly shifted from Kashmir as a bilateral issue to solving Kashmir bilaterally with international help. To quote Richard Armitage: “(Kashmir) will be solved bilaterally, but I think with the help, and the assistance and encouragement of the international community, first among them the United States...” India’s problem is the old, old one of distinguishing between terrorism and Kashmir. Terrorism is international while Kashmir is internal. However, terrorism and Kashmir are two sides of the same coin. Islamabad fosters terrorism precisely to internationalise Kashmir. In other words, the US must hand out some assurance as regards Kashmir for General Musharraf “permanently” to end cross-border terrorism. It is significant that more and more Indian analysts are today speaking about US intervention in Kashmir. From their point, clearly, India can only gain from this. For one, today Pakistan faces international isolation on cross-border terrorism. Second, there are definite indications that the popular mood in the Valley has turned against Pakistan. If so, why not start by having a debate? [xxxiii]

CP Bhambhri wrote on similar lines. If September 11, 2001 was a defining moment for the Americans, India, on its part, was shocked on December 13, when terrorists succeeded in breaking the security cordon to attack Parliament. The Government ordered full-scale military mobilisation. Its aim was to punish Pakistan militarily for indulging in cross-border terrorism. Not only this. Foreign and defence policymakers built a diplomatic front to convey a clear message to the US: The 'global coalition' against terrorism could not ignore the fact that Pakistan sponsored terrorist activities against India. India showed its determination by mobilising a one million-strong force to confront terrorists and their supporter, the Government of Pakistan. India believed the military and diplomatic fronts against Pakistan-supported terrorism would activate its Western alliance partners, and that they would succeed in containing Pakistan. It believed the West had enough economic and military clout to do so. This premise concerning the West's capacities and intentions proved hollow. American soldiers were stationed in Pakistani territory and Pakistan was a frontline ally in the US's fight against Al Qaeda militants. Indian policymakers failed to realise that the Americans would play a wishy-washy role in the India-Pakistan dispute over Jammu & Kashmir (J&K).[xxxiv]

India may now be in a position to take advantage of the current international environment if it is prepared to drop old slogans on third party involvement in its disputes with Pakistan. These mantras have been collectively parroted for so long that why the nation adopted them in the first place ages ago is almost lost to memory . This does not mean India must organise a table for three to discuss the Kashmir dispute, with one chair for the U.S. But what New Delhi can do is to recognise that the U.S. is no longer hostile to it on Kashmir and that its recent interventions in the Subcontinent have helped Indian interests. India's coercive diplomacy since December 13 has succeeded in mobilising the American power to force Pakistan into new commitments on giving up cross-border terrorism. In the unfolding high level engagement with the U.S. in the next few days, New Delhi must focus not only on getting Gen. Musharraf to implement his promises but also on preparing the ground for a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute.[xxxv]

Besides, it may now be something more than Kashmir for India. While the world's attention is riveted on Kashmir as the flashpoint of a possible India-Pakistan war, 120,000 Indian Muslims remain in Gujarat refugee camps -- afraid to return to their villages for fear of a resurgence attacks. This festering challenge to India's stability as a secular democracy explains what the Kashmir crisis is all about. The governing factor in the current confrontation between New Delhi and Islamabad is the danger of an uncontrollable chain reaction of Hindu reprisals against Muslims throughout India if the Muslims of Kashmir opt for independence or for accession to Pakistan. New Delhi is prepared to risk war not for the sake of retaining Kashmir as such but to ensure against the destabilizing impact of a change in the status quo on India as a whole. For different reasons, neither India nor Pakistan wants Kashmir to be independent, and the United States, like India, has special reason to view such a prospect with alarm. Independence would make Kashmir a permanent sanctuary for Islamic extremist terrorist operations. American interests would be best served by promoting an autonomous Kashmir within the Indian security framework, reflecting a broader recognition that India, a rising power, will be much more important to the United States in future decades than troubled Pakistan[xxxvi]

And how do the Pakistanis see the benefits? When President Pervez Musharraf took the momentous decision to side with the United States in October 2001 in its global war on terrorism, he clearly hoped that, as an ultimate reward, his country would also become part of a strategic partnership that the US was interested in developing in South Asia. Now, in June 2002, Pakistan stands on the sidelines as Washington and New Delhi are steadily developing their strategic partnership that was put on the backburner, at least while Operation Enduring Freedom was in progress. That strategic partnership looks ominous from the Pakistan perspectives. If it continues-as it appears to be-it will not be long before Pakistan will conclude that the United States is once again using it to fulfil its long-range strategic purpose in southern Asia, in which Washington views it as a mere pawn.[xxxvii]

[i] The Hindu 3 June 2002
[ii] Sridhar Krishnaswami The Hindu 3 June 2002.
[iii] Hindustan Times 3 June 2002
[iv] Jyoti Malhotra The Indian Express 18 June 2002
[v] Shekhar Gupta The Indian Express 1 June 2002
[vi] Anurag Sinha The Indian Express 1 June 2002
[vii] Dawn 1 June 2002
[viii] Elisabeth Bumiller and Todd S. Purdum The New York Times The International Herald Tribune 1 June 2002
[ix] S. Rajagopalan Hindustan Times 1 June 2002
[x] Bradley Graham and Thomas E. Ricks The Washington Post 1 June 2002
[xi] The Indian Express 1 June 2002
[xii] Eleventh Hour in Kashmir, Jefferson Morley Washington Post 3 June 2002
[xiii] Celia W Dugger The New York Times 4 June 2002
[xiv] Hindustan Times 4 June 2002
[xv] The Pioneer 5 June 2002
[xvi] Hindustan Times 6 June 2002
[xvii] PTI Hindustan Times 6 June 2002
[xviii] Seth Mydans The New York Time 6 June 2002
[xix] Tini Tran, AP The Independent 6 June 2002
[xx] Reuters The Times of India 6 June 2002
[xxi] Hindustan Times 8 June 2002
[xxii] PTI The Times of India 8 June 2002
[xxiii] C. Raja Mohan The Hindu 8 June 2002
[xxiv] Salman Haider The Statesman 18 June 2002
[xxv] The Times of India 20 June 2002
[xxvi] Hindustan Times 20 June 2002
[xxvii] The Times of India 21 June 2002
[xxviii] Pramit Pal Chaudhuri Hindustan Times 12 June 2002
[xxix] Ashok K Mehta The Pioneer 19 June 2002
[xxx] Winning without war: Synergy between diplomacy and defence has worked — but lots more to do editorial The Indian Express 19 June 2002
[xxxi]Hindustan Times 28 June 2002
[xxxii] Withdraw the Indian threat of war Husain Haqqani The International Herald Tribune 11 June 2002
[xxxiii] Coercive Mediation The Times of India 12 June 2002
[xxxiv] US mediation is the message The Pioneer 29 June 2002
[xxxv] Drawing America into Kashmir C. Raja Mohan The Hindu 6 June 2002
[xxxvi] India's Bottom Line Selig S. Harrison The Washington Post 11 June 2002
[xxxvii] Ehsan Ahrari Dawn 22 June 2002

Compiled from Media Sources

By

Arabinda Acharya