Terrorism does not have any religion; nor does it have any loyalty. It took a brutal attack against the world’s most powerful nation to convince the civilized world that it does not have any boundary either. On 11 September 2001, world watched in horror and disbelief the death and destruction holding a cosmic dance at World Trade Center and Pentagon, the citadel of United State’s economic and military might. In an operation lasting few hours only, the terrorist mastermind, Osama bin Laden demonstrated how it is possible to use terrorism as a ‘global instrument’ to ‘compete with and challenge’ the traditionally organized state power and mobilize new global conflicts. ⁱⁱ Al Qaeda’s extraordinarily coordinated suicide attacks on September 11 now stand testimony to the enormity of the challenge and vulnerability that the modern world faces from international terrorism. As Osama bin Laden asserted, with September 11, the “West had become the ‘weak horse’ that could be defied with impunity.”ⁱⁱⁱ

The Threat

Terrorism is not new to the world. However in recent times, it has become more persistent and lethal. The post Cold War era strategic environment transformed the nature and character of conflicts in the international arena. With threats of large wars gone, the world got re-polarized along the lines of the zones of affluence and peace and that of poverty and turbulence. The growing asymmetry in capabilities and lack of access to resources became the primary generators of new kinds conflicts. These involve non-state entities using unconventional means of aggression and violence fuelled more often than not by ethnic and even religious fervor. With modern technology, global connections and innovative ways of financing, these non-state actors, especially the transnational terrorist groups, have been able to mobilize extraordinary capabilities and resources to wage and sustain unconventional warfare against traditional centers of state power. Harnessing the forces of globalization- opportunities provided by trans-border mobility, advances in communications technologies - these non-state actors have become less dependent on state funding and sponsorship and come to thrive instead on loose, transnational affiliations based on religious or ideological affinity and a common hatred of the enemy. With a combination of decentralized cells operating across the globe and united by religion and ideology, the ‘new terrorists’ have now become the harbingers of violence of a new type, one that aims to produce casualties including even civilians and non-combatants on a mass scale. ^iv

Terrorism: Old and New

Terrorism is a form of asymmetric warfare to achieve some objective- political, ideological, religious, psychological even personal. This may include, ethnic and or religious minorities wishing to establish separate homeland for their communities – Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, or the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines, or ideologically motivated groups struggling against perceived injustice and oppression such as the Maoists in Nepal or the Communists/Marxists groups in the Indian heartland. There are also religious groups and semi religious sects with less comprehensible motivations as distinguished from the objectives of the groups with ideological, ethno-nationalist and separatist orientations. These groups espouse more amorphous religious and even millenarian aims, which often go beyond establishment of separate theocratic states. Some of these groups are motivated by mythical, almost transcendental and divinely inspired imperatives. Based on a volatile mixture of seditious, racial and religious dicta, groups such as Aum Shinrikyo (Japan), White (Christian) Supremacists (The US), Algerian GIA, Lebanese Hezbollah and Al Qaeda engage in acts of violence purported to cause death and destruction in a large scale.

Unfortunately there is as yet no universal way of defining terrorism. There is much ambivalence about the concept, which accommodates euphemisms such as ‘one man’s terrorist is other man’s freedom fighter.’ Even after September 11 incidents in which a large number of civilians from a number of countries were victims of unprecedented violence, a consensus on the issue of the definition of terrorism still eludes the international community. For instance even though the United Nations adopted a series of far reaching measures to fight terrorism- the terrorist groups, their leaders, their financial infrastructure- the world body could not bring itself to adopt an universal definition. In its report to the UN General Assembly, the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism conceded difficulties on this issue when it sought to delineate some broad characteristics of terrorism without attempting a comprehensive definition of the concept. It would however be suffice to say that terrorism is deliberate and premeditated use of violence, targeting civilians and non-combatants. In most cases, terrorism essentially is a political act. It is meant to create an atmosphere of fear, generally for political or ideological (whether secular or religious) purposes.^v Terrorism is a strategy, and it is the means that they choose- not the end, which make them terrorists.

There has been a qualitative change in the trends and patterns of terrorism in the post-Cold War era. In the past most terrorist organizations had clear political objectives. They were conservative in their operations and engaged themselves in highly selective and mostly discriminate acts of violence- targeting the sources of their hostility- foreign embassies, national airlines, banks etc or kidnapped and assassinated persons identified with oppression or exploitation. The groups took care to calibrate attacks to produce just enough bloodshed to get attention for their cause, but not so much as to alienate public support.^vi Today's terrorists on the other hand, seek to inflict mass casualties even at the risk of alienating sympathizers. ^vii

It is important to understand why terrorists use violence?
The terrorists perceive the existing system as oppressive or unresponsive to their cause. For them it is a fight against the authority backed by the power and the force of the state in which they find disadvantaged. This induces them to engage in acts of violence against strategic targets- armed forces, leadership, as well as targets of symbolic value- infrastructures with historic and economic significance to draw attention to their cause. They engage in deliberate and spectacular acts of violence or threat of violence to derive the psychological impact of intimidation. Violence also weakens the resolve of the authority and undermines public confidence on the government.

The New Face of Terror

The nature and the scales violence differentiate the present breed of radical terrorists from the ones in the past, which had specific objectives, which were mainly secular. Today a very large number of terrorists are influenced by religion and motivated by objectives sectarian, religious, ethnic or even personal overtones. These new brands of supranational neo-fundamentalists are in a way a product of contemporary globalization. They are motivated not as much by material deprivation as by an all-consuming ideology. They are reacting against westernization, which they believe ‘masquerades as globalization and whose chief instruments are the military, cultural, and economic powers of the United States.’ ^viii They see themselves to be fighting on behalf of religion against the enemies of God, and pursuing goals they consider higher than life itself. They are being propelled by a vision that treats religion as the answer to every conceivable problem.^ix While previous secular nationalist terrorist organizations understood that violence especially involving civilians could be counterproductive, ^x these religiously motivated terrorists recognize no constraints on violence. ^xi The increasing salience of religious motives in particular has contributed to the increasing lethality of international terrorism and has also increased the likelihood of use of weapons of mass destruction by the terrorist groups.^xii

Though it is wrong and counterproductive to associate terrorism with any particular religion, a strand of Islam has come to epitomize religious terrorism in the recent years. The groups identifying themselves with this cause are fuelled by religious fervor and ideological indoctrination of the worst kind. This type of religious orthodoxy however is based on a corrupt interpretation of the religious text. The advocates of this orthodoxy are manipulating Islam as a tool of mass mobilization, by extracting and using selective texts from the Koran to show how the modern ideas and the instruments of modernity are apostate, with out the sanction of the religious law and need to be abhorred. xiii Claiming incompatibility of Islam with other creeds, Islamist groups are projecting Muslim community’s conflict with the West as some sort of ‘clash of civilizations.’ This has been made more complicated and difficult as the community is coming face to face with the demands of modernity and change. It appears that the Muslim community is finding itself threatened, disadvantaged and marginalized by the processes of globalization. It finds economic globalization as benefiting the West and harming vast segments of the Muslim world. Political Islam has exacerbated the conflict by transforming economic grievances into a mistrust of Westernization and even into an antagonism to modernity. xiv This form of radical Islam has festered in societies where contact with the West has produced more chaos than growth and more uncertainty than wealth. xv Viewed in this perspective the radical Islam is manipulating the inherent tension between secular capitalism based on free trade, individual rights and democracy and ethnic and religious fundamentalismxvi to construct and nurture its campaign of hatred against the West. This form of radical Islam has become immensely appealing, because it purports to explain the loss of values and cultural disorientation facing Muslim societies confronting the challenges of globalization and modernization.^xvii

Al Qaeda: The Revolutionary Vanguard

Spearheading this campaign of hatred against the West, especially against the United States is Al Qaeda, an international terrorist network. Under the leadership of Osama bin Laden. In 1988, Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian scholar and former leader of the Muslim Brotherhood Organization and Osama bin Laden co-founded Al Qaeda al-Sulbah (The Solid Base) in Pakistan to create a worldwide framework of Islamist military and political organizations. After Azzam’s death, Osama turned Al Qaeda (the Base), ‘into a global terrorist front’ and a center for worldwide Islamist revolution. ^xviii Creating a complex ‘confederation’ of militant groups and ‘aggregating support networks,’^xix Al Qaeda recruited, trained, and financed thousands of mujahedeen, or holy warriors, from several countries in the Middle East, Asia and the Horn of Africa. Al Qaeda and its leader Osama bin Laden brought disparate Islamist groups from these countries together by creating a common platform and a common agenda.^xx Al Qaeda’s rallying point revolves around the call for universal jihad against the United States, its allies and regimes, including moderate Muslim governments, accused by the group of imposing dysfunctional and immoral way of life across the globe.^xxi One of the biggest accomplishments of Osama bin Laden was the effective ‘melding of the strands of religious fervor, Muslim piety and a profound sense of grievance in to a powerful ideological force.^xxii With a robust propaganda and communication network, Al Qaeda was able to entrench the anti-western universal jihad ideology firmly among the politicized and radicalized Muslims around the globe. With remarkable sophistication it managed to harness the Muslim extremist forces, unify radical Islam and to focus its rage. Osama has always depicted the US as the main Western power -the head of the poisonous snake- threatening the very existence of Islam and the Muslim Ummah. Osama’s call for universal jihad assimilated well in the hearts and minds of sizeable pockets of ideologically exclusionist and politically repressed young Muslims throughout the world.^xxiii Beset by alienation and loneliness and consummated by an intense search for identity, these people have fallen prey to a formalistic understanding of Islam that breeds violent radicalism.^xxiv Various groups struggling for separate identity have also found themselves bound together by an increasing hatred against the West. By aligning their cause with that of Al Qaeda, these groups are able to continue with their domestic struggles, but additionally are able to reflect it through the prism of a global cause and a global purpose, namely, the defence of Islam. ^xxv

However it is wrong to accept that there is an inevitability of conflict between Islam and the West. It is not correct to assume that “not all may be terrorists, but all terrorists are Muslims.”^xxvi At the same time though, it will be dangerous to discount the potency of the Islamic religious discourse in fuelling the contemporary wave of terrorism. The Islamist threat is a part ideological radicalism underlying belief system among the Muslim community. From the Al Qaeda’s perspective, this is a conflict between the true followers of God and God’s enemies including the Muslims who align themselves with the West. ^xxvii Osama is incensed at the presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia. He sees US as the one preventing Palestinians getting their homeland. He has built this resentment into a profound sense of universal grievance among the Muslim communities vis-à-vis the West. But the conflict is not against Islam as a religion or a civilization but rather against a radically intolerant and anti-modernist doctrine.^xxviii It is more about a struggle for the soul of Islam within the global Muslim community today. Many Islamic scholars point to the ‘moral and ideological crisis’ that has beset ‘the collective Muslim mind.’^xxix A category of self-appointed defenders of orthodoxy seems to have hijacked some of the key instruments of the ideology, i.e. Jihad, Fatwa, and Shariah, to make them serve their politically utilitarian and instrumental purposes. ^xxx As Mahathir Mohamad, the former Prime Minister of Malaysia put it, it is not Islam which obstructs its progress, but its “wrong and rigid interpretations.”^xxxi

Responding to the Threat

It is in this context that the Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr. Goh Chok Tong remarked that “militant Islamic terrorism is to the 21st century what communism was to the 20th - a global ideological battle,” and urged the international community to fight terrorism with ‘ideas, not just armies.’ ^xxxii It is critically important to deconstruct the ideology and isolate the factors, which create and sustain the tensions that find expression through acts of violence. ^xxxiii Changing the minds and wining the hearts by addressing the grievances that underlie the call for jihad needs to be the part of the overall strategy to mitigate the problems of global terrorism. ^xxxiv There is a need to persuade Muslims that the West harbors no ulterior motive, no desire to subjugate them, as the radical Islamic movement suggests.^xxxv An overemphasized militaristic approach risks further marginalizing the disaffected and increasing the ranks of the jihadis.

Before September 11 terrorism was mostly being looked at as a law enforcement problem and left to the initiatives of the victim states themselves. To some extent the prevailing moral ambivalence among the international community about the general issue of terrorism was responsible for such an attitude. Governments, especially those in the West were indifferent to the conflicts in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, which had been the primary generators of terrorism.^xxxvi However, September 11 incidents changed the attitude of the international community significantly. Countries all over the world came forward to build coalitions and alignments against terrorism. There was an unequivocal understanding that acts of terror could no longer be justified on moral or political grounds. There was also an increase in support for international institutions especially for the United Nations. This was to get counter-terrorism policies whether initiated by one country or limited set of countries endorsed on a global basis. Within the span of a few weeks after September 11 attacks, the Security Council unanimously passed resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001), and the General Assembly adopted resolution 56/1 by consensus, underlining the depth of shared international commitment to an effective, sustained and multilateral response to the problem of terrorism. ^xxxvii Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) is both a comprehensive and a specific statement of the international community’s desire to deny terrorists the tools of their trade - finance, secrecy, arms and shelter. The resolution also established the Counter-Terrorism Committee to monitor the progress in implementation of measures suggested in the resolution. Resolution 1390 (2002), strengthened by Resolution 1455, (2003) authorized the continuation of the sanctions regimes against Bin Laden, the Taliban and associated entities all over the World.

War on Terror: Are We Winning or Losing?

The outcome of global war on terror, especially the assaults on the terrorist haven in Afghanistan and their state sponsor, the Taliban was very successful initially. Taliban’s ouster was accompanied by the disruption of Al Qaeda bases, training facilities and other logistical networks not only in Afghanistan but also in many other parts of the world. Many top ranking leaders of the Al Qaeda and its associate groups were either killed or captured across the globe. According to an estimate, about 3200 out of about 4000 of core Al Qaeda cadre have been effectively neutralized by the coalition actions.^xxxviii Unprecedented coordination among various countries and intelligence and information sharing among law enforcement and counter terrorism agencies prevented a series of planned attacks in many parts of the world.

However as some of the recent incidents suggest, these successes have not been commensurate with the regenerative and adoptive capabilities of the terrorist groups especially Al Qaeda. Attacks in Tunisia, Pakistan, Bali, Yemen, Mombassa, Riyadh, Chechnya, Jakarta, Istanbul, and Madrid and now in Iraq bear testimony to the global reach and virulence of the international terrorist network spearheaded by Al Qaeda. As a group, Al Qaeda itself remains resilient enough to continue with its campaign of terror, targeting not only the interests of the United States, but its allies and supporters worldwide. It has mutated into new forms and adopted itself with the changing operational environment. After it was uprooted from Afghanistan, Al Qaeda demonstrated remarkable dexterity in adapting to a borderless existence. Similarly, despite arrests of many key leaders and members, JI continues to remain a threat in Southeast Asia as is the case with various other Al Qaeda associated and affiliated groups elsewhere in the world. In many parts of the world, new groups have emerged with identity of interests with those of Al Qaeda. Some analysts believe that the Al Qaeda’s activities has become a ‘franchise operation’ with like minded local groups and operatives taking up the mantles of global jihad on its behalf.^xxxix Besides the terrorist threats seem to have shifted from the groups to a cadre of highly motivated and resourceful individuals such as for example, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi now active in Iraq. Thus the network has merely changed its shape, survived, and now continuing with the fight all over the globe.^xl In the context of Iraq, the movement’s sense of commitment and purpose appears to have become greater than ever.”^xli It will not be an exaggeration to say that ‘Al Qaedaism’ has become a movement on its own and it would not probably alter the dynamics of militant Islamic terrorist threat much even if Osama bin Laden is killed or captured or if Al Qaeda is completely decimated.

What explains this lack of momentum and success in the global campaign against terrorism? At the tactical level, the failure of the international community to come to grips with the threats of terrorism can be attributed to several factors. One is the failure to understand the nature of the threat including the vision, capabilities, acumen and the organizational skills of Osama bin Laden, the “terrorism’s CEO.”^xlii There is also a failure to address the core issues that have brought trans-national Islamist groups into the centre-stage of conflict against the West in the first place and helped sustain their campaign. At the strategic level, the spirit of cooperation seems to have been completely overwhelmed by some of the policies of the United States, the country, which also leads the coalition against terrorism. Its Iraq engagement has seriously jeopardized the global terrorism campaign, creating a major diversion from and a major division among its allies fighting, the ‘war on terror.’^xliii The war in Iraq had “radicalized the Islamic world” against America and furthered the hostility towards the United States and the West among Muslims around the globe. As Richard A. Clarke, a former top US counter-terrorism official put it; “no one could have done a better job for Al Qaeda than we have for Al Qaeda by invading Iraq… We have expanded the pool of their supporters.” ^xliv The enormity of the resistance in Iraq against US-led forces is indicative of this trend. This has emboldened the terrorists, especially Al Qaeda and its leader Osama bin Laden to gloat that, ‘the enemies have been stunned by the ferocity of the resistance.”^xlv The Iraqi prison abuse expose has only added to Washington’s woes. There is a growing disagreement among the international community at the political level that is making the global counter-terrorism strategy less and less effective.

Conclusion

In Iraq, Al Qaeda sees US occupation, as the manifestation of its evil scheme to “dissolve the Islamic identity in the whole of the Islamic World.” It is also using the disagreement among the international community on this issue to isolate the rest of the West, especially the Europeans from the United States. History will probably judge US appropriately for its unilateral and probably avoidable action against Iraq. But this does not absolve the international community from continuing with a common front against terrorism, the new global scourge of the twenty-first century. Paradoxically Iraq today provides a historic opportunity to strangle the terrorist hydra in one go. It is becoming increasingly evident that Al Qaeda has marshaled all his forces in Iraq. With prudence and right judgment it may just be possible to expose the tunnel of terror in Iraq and decimate the enemy. Besides as the use of force may be successful in the short-term as a counter-terrorism strategy, it is also necessary for the international community to work together to roll back the threats of radical Islamic terrorism by helping the larger Muslim community achieve personal piety and peace, freedom and prosperity along with the rest of the world. No single country can be able do this on its own. Therefore the role and salience of international institutions such as the United Nations can hardly be overemphasized. It goes much to the credit of the United Nations that transfer of sovereignty to Iraqis under an UN supported framework was found legitimate and acceptable to all. It therefore behooves on the member states to open more political, economic and strategic space for the United Nations so as to enable it to play a bigger role for the safety, peace and prosperity of our future generations.

ⁱ This article is based on my presentation to the ‘Introduction to United Nations’ organized by United Nations Association of Singapore for College Students on 22 May 2004. I wish to express my gratitude to the organizers for the opportunity given to me and for their effort in getting the young scholars familiar with emerging security issues.
ⁱⁱ Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 1
ⁱⁱⁱ Cited in, Graham Allison, “Nuclear Terrorism Poses the Gravest Threat Today,” Wall Street Journal, 15 July 2003, available at http://www.frontpagemag.com/articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=8926
^iv Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, “America and New Terrorism,” Survival, 42:1 (Spring 2000), p.59
^v Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism http://www.un.org/terrorism/a57273.htm
^vi Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 197
^vii Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, America and New Terrorism, Survival, Vol. 42, No.1. (Spring 2000), p.59
^viii Timur Kuran, “The Religious Undercurrents of Muslim Economic Grievances,” Social Science Research Council, available at http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/kuran.htm
^ix Ibid.
^x Peter L. Bergen, Picking up the Pieces: What We Can Learn From and About 9/11, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 2 (March/April 2002), p. 172
^xi Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, The Terror, Survival, Vol. 43, No.4, (Winter 2002), pp. 5-6
^xii Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 197
^xiii Karim Raslan, “Now a historic Chance to Welcome Muslims into the system,” The International Herald Tribune, 27 November 2001, available at http://www.asiasource.org/asip/raslan.cfm
^xiv Timur Kuran, “The Religious Undercurrents of Muslim Economic Grievances,”
^xv Fareed Zakaria, “The Return of History: What September 11 Hath Wrought,” in James F. Hoge and Giden Rose, Eds. How did This Happen? (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), p. 316
^xvi See, Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. MacWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996)
^xvii Francis Fukuyama, “History and September 11,” in Ken Booth, and Tim Dunne, Eds. Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order, (New York: Pal grave Macmillan, 2002) p. 32
^xviii Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, p.2-4
^xix Jean-Charles Brisard, “Terrorism Financing: Roots and Trends of Saudi Terrorism Financing,” Report Prepared for the President of the Security Council, (Paris: JCB Consulting, 19 December 2002), p. 6 available at http://www.nationalreview.com/document/document-un122002.pdf
^xx Rohan Gunaratna, Ed. The Changing Face of Terrorism, (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2004), p. 14
^xxi Peter Chalk, “Al Qaeda and Its Links to Terrorist Groups in Asia,” in Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna, Eds. The New Terrorism, Anatomy, Trends and Counter Strategies (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2002), p. 109
^xxii Bruce Hoffman, p. 38
^xxiii Barry Desker and Kumar Ramakrishna, “Forging an Indirect strategy in Southeast Asia,” The Washington Quarterly, 25:2 (Spring 2002), p. 166
xiv Abdurrahaman Wahid, “Best Way to Fight Islamic Extremism,” The Sunday Times, (Singapore), 14 April 2002
^xxiv Barry Desker, “The Jemaah Islamiyah Phenomenon in Singapore,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 25:3 (2003), p. 493
^xxvi Cited in Bret T. Saalwaechter, “Militarism, Fear, and New Communism,” Democratic Underground.com, 7 May 2004, available at http://www.democraticunderground.com/articles/04/05/p/07_fear.html
^xxvii Chris Brown, “Narratives of Religion, Civilization and Modernity,” in Ken Booth, and Tim Dunne, Eds. Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 296
^xxviiiFrancis Fukuyama, “History and September 11,” p. 32
^xxvix See Farish A. Noor, New Voices of Islam (Leiden: Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World, 2002)
^xxx Farish A. Noor, “The Evolution of 'Jihad' in Islamist Political Discourse: How a Plastic Concept Became Harder,” Social Science Research Council, available at http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/noor.htm
^xxxi Mahathir Mohamad, “Breaking the Muslim Mindset,” The Sunday Times, (Singapore), 28 July 2002
^xxxii Goh Chok Tong, “Fight Terror With Ideas, not Just Armies, speech of the Prime Minister of Singapore at the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington D.C. on 6 May 2004,” as reproduced by The Straits Times, 7 May 2004
^xxxiii Kumar Ramakrishna and Andrew Tan, “The New Terrorism: Diagnosis and Prescriptions,” in Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna, Eds. The New Terrorism, Anatomy, Trends and Counter Strategies, (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2002), p. 4
^xxxiv Michael Mandelbaum, “Diplomacy in Wartime: New Priorities and Alignments,” in James F. Hoge and Giden Rose, Eds. How did This Happen? (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), P. 263
^xxxv Barry Desker and Kumar Ramakrishna, p. 168
^xxxvi “Terrorist Financing: Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations,” p.32
^xxxvii “Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism,” Annex to A/57/273 (New York: United Nations), available at http://www.un.org/terrorism/a57273.htm#top
^xxxviii Rohan Gunaratna, “The Post Madrid Face of Al Qaeda,” The Washington Quarterly, 27:3 (Summer 2004) p. 93. The figure 4000 members come from Al Qaeda detainee debriefs, including the FBI interrogation of Mohommad Mansour Jabarah, Canadian operative of Kuwaiti-Iraqi origin now in USA custody since 2002.
^xxxix bid., p. 4
^xl Rohan Gunaratna, “Al Qaeda’s Trajectory in 2003,” IDSS Perspectives, 3 May 2003, available at http://www.ntu.edu.sg/idss/perspective/research_050303.htm
^xli Ibid., p. 22
^xlii Bruce Hoffman, “The Emergence of New Terrorism,” in Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna, Eds. The New Terrorism, Anatomy, Trends and Counter Strategies (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2002), p. 35
^xliii “Fighting a New Cold War,” Business Week, 29 March 2004, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_13/b3876020.htm.
^xliv Richard A. Clarke, cited in “We're Losing Wars,” Philadelphia Daily News, 1 May 2004, available at http://www.philly.com/mld/philly/news/breaking_news/8564850.htm?1c
^xlv “Transcript of Osama bin Laden audio taped message,” CBS News (London Desk), 6 May 2004