Building a Taj Mahal of Trust

When Pakistan CEO, General Mussaraff got himself sworn in as President Mussaraff, the move was seen in the context of his desire to present himself from a position of constitutional authority and as equal in status during upcoming summit talks with his Indian counterpart. Given the volatility of constitutional experience in Pakistan and in the background of Army rule and its grip on the general public opinion and the fact that the event went on without much protest, Mussaraf can get away with the stunt and present himself as the representing the popular sentiment in Pakistan in respect of key issues that are slated to be discussed, Kashmir included. The General has gone on record to assert that, in Pakistan, a military regime only holds any prospect of binding the government and civilians to commitments of any kind with India. This also explains the diplomatic aerobics that the General has displayed in handing out warnings, advising caution to and expecting restraint from the militant outfits active in the cause of liberation of Kashmir. The Musharraf consistency ultimately paid off, ensuring not only the invitation, but in keeping Kashmir issue central to the discussions.

What about New Delhi? Sensitive issues like Kashmir must need to be based on some sort of national consensus. With the government being run with a coalition of political parties with myriad philosophy and independence of opinion jealously guarded, the Indian Prime Minister may well find himself conducting negotiation in a vacuum unless he manages to concoct a cocktail of opinion in the mean time.

That a consensus must emerge, none is in doubt. The National Democratic Alliance made it a point to tell the electorate that its governance will invariably be based on consensus. The trouble starts when some balancing of opinion is needed. Even among the constituents of the ruling National Front in India, there had been instances of fissures and acrimony on certain vital areas of national importance and definitely on the sensitive issue of Kashmir. This was apparent when the largest constituent BJP made its reservations clear about "autonomy" when the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir and leader of National Conference got the proposal adopted by the state Legislature. And now that President Musharraf has accepted and arranged to invite the APHC leaders for a tête-à-tête over tea, the entire Indian political spectrum appeared to have broken loose. Home Minister said even though major peace initiatives had been taken by the Government since the Lahore process, there "has not been and will not be any softness towards taking on the militants. There will be no relaxation in our security measures."

Expectations Galore:

It is as if that a single meeting can resolve all outstanding, contentious and often bitter issues between the two countries. This is what is emerging from the statement of expectations (summit should be converted into a "Lahore Plus" exercise also "help undo Kargil," bring a forward movement on Kashmir) that is being handed out by various persons, groups and organisations. Besides there is no dearth of opinion on how and what to discuss, the modalities, the framework, the background some even invoking resolutions (the UN’s resolution on Kashmir), agreements (the Shimla Agreement), events (the Lahore Trek), that may no longer be relevant. Though any sure-fire agreement on sensitive issues especially Kashmir is not in the reckoning, Quazi Hussain Ahmad, The Jammat –I-Islam leader has been quoted as saying in Karachi that his organisation expected Gen. Musharraf to reflect the aspirations of Pakistan as well as the Kashmiris when he meets Mr. Vajpayee. Pakistan should urge India to accept the Kashmiris' participation in talks and resolve the Kashmir issue in accordance with the UN resolutions. Dr. Farooq Abdullah, the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir is of the opinion that only the two neighbours can hammer out a solution. Whatever the outcome of the first round of talks by Mr. Pant with various groups in the State, people in Kashmir will wait and watch for the Vajpayee-Musharraf meeting.
New Delhi runs the risk of being blamed for failure to demonstrate some kind tangible results. Vajpayee is understood to have explained to his cabinet colleagues and other leaders in opposition that the invitation as well as the calling off of the "cease-fire" in Jammu and Kashmir - was part of a larger search for peace in the region, and should be seen as a continuation of the "Lahore process." This was the reiteration of what New Delhi’s Home Minister said about the summit being the "second historic opportunity" for Pakistan to broker peace after India’s Lahore initiative but said that New Delhi will not lower its guard because of the talks.

The Stakes:

Groups in Pakistan have questioned Musharraf’s legitimacy to negotiate. The ex-Premier and absentee PPP leader, Benazir says that the shopping bags he (Musharraf) brings home will be empty of substantive agreements. Even otherwise a Musharraf agreement would lack legitimacy in Pakistan, the issues propelling the general towards the summit being external sanctions, lack of internal support, economic bankruptcy and dependence on international financial institutions. ‘‘Even as General Musharraf packs his bags for a visit to Delhi, the city where he was born, he can hardly be envied. He goes there as the weakest leader Pakistan has had in its dealing with its old rival,’’ Benazir said. "He will enjoy the journey to his hometown that he left at partition. It will be filled with nostalgia. But the shopping bags he brings home will be empty of substantive agreements,’’ she said. Stating that a Musharraf agreement would lack legitimacy in Pakistan, she said ‘‘India’s credentials as the world’s largest democracy are hardly helped by dealing with a dictator. He will need to show movement to continue with the oxygen mask given to him through the Delhi invitation,’’ Bhutto added.

Jamaat leader Qazi Hussain Ahmed cautioned Musharraf against that negates the perceived sacrifice of so called Kashmir jihadees. "Those who come to power through the back door have no right to make decisions of national interest," he said adding that said General Pervez Musharraf had no mandate to hold talks with India. Pakistan’s former Army chief, General (retd.) Mirza Aslam Beg, says it will be a ‘weakened’ Musharraf that India would be dealing with at the forthcoming Agra summit. His decision to install himself as President has revived his international isolation without any corresponding domestic gains in Pakistan. Given the fact that there are elements trying to derail the initiative, for Musharraf any positive development that goes to reduce tension in the region will help him secure the international acceptance and internal legitimacy he desperately needs.

An early confirmation that there is a "definitive change of the political mindset" in Rawalpindi could increase the prospects for a productive conversation between Gen. Musharraf and Mr. Vajpayee. A substantive reduction of cross-border terrorism should make it possible for the Government to acknowledge the importance of the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir. An understanding on how to address the issue in the days ahead should then clear the way for beneficial bilateral engagement across the board. But it may be too early to celebrate. There is some distance to go before all the key players in India are convinced of the change in mindset across the border. And there will be skeptics who would caution Gen. Musharraf against normalisation of relations with India. (C. Raja Mohan The Hindu 18 June 2001)

Majority of the respondents to a poll in India (by TNS Mode for Hindustan Times) were of the opinion that Musharraf can not be trusted. What is disconcerting however has been the uncertainty about an agreement by Vajpayee government being accepted and honored by any other party that comes to power in future. There has been this feeling even among the ruling coalition that the present initiative is a personal agenda of Vajpayee who now occupies the chair of the Prime Minister of the country, a continuum not only of his ‘Bus Diplomacy’ at Lahore, but also of the mission dating back to the time when as Minister of External Affairs he talked shop with Zia-ul-Haq. By now, the sense of outrage over the Kargil betrayal had weakened - at the end of two years since Kargil. Vajpayee was, thus, able to persuade himself to deal with the architect of Kargil. As this tide reversed, the old theories came to the fore - that it was easier for India- Pakistan problems to be resolved when the BJP was at the helm in India and the military in control of the administration in Pakistan.

There are some who insist that there can always be other ways of organizing cooperation and peace between the two countries- sports linkages, high cultural exchanges (classical dance, music, etc), tourism, academic conferences (which the Ministry of Home Affairs is trying to make virtually impossible), trade between private businesses, the availability of each other's popular cultural artifacts and products (newspapers, magazines, books, television and radio shows, films). This is how civil society knits diverse cultures, religion and different peoples together in bonds of peace and cooperation. (Kanti Bajpayee)

Diplomatic players on both sides of the contentious border will do well to follow a prudent course of managing the present bilateral expectations by simply brushing aside the temptation to turn the public spotlight on one or more sets of ideas in the name of idealism or even pragmatism… A simple standard of statesmanship is that both New Delhi, which seems obsessed with the notion of keeping the Hurriyat out of the India-Pakistan spectrum, and Pakistan, which appears insistent on engaging the APHC somehow, should not allow this issue to cloud the bilateral ambience at this sensitive juncture of fragile hopes.

As people close to Musharraf themselves have said, no civilian government in Pakistan will find it easy to implement any agreement with India due to strong resistance from the Army and the ISI. Only a military ruler stands a chance to sort out the differences. At this point of history, General Musharraf appears to be the right man in Pakistan to start a dialog

Sections in India would like to see normalization of relations between the two countries. With Iran -India gas pipeline that is to pass through Pakistan, Indian business is also interested for the Pakistani market and expect Pakistan to grant the most favored nation (MFN) status to India (India granted the status to Pakistan as early as 1995) to accelerate bilateral trade. New Delhi also sees immense diplomatic advantage in the talks particularly in the context of the new found warmth in its relations with Washington. And even though for India Kashmir is not negotiable, other areas on the Line Of Control can be points for discussion along with issues relating to Siachen, terrorism, drugs and economic cooperation.

The challenge before Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and President Pervez Musharraf is to revive the Lahore process and make it irreversible. This can be done only by a set of understandings which assure each side that the issues it holds dear will be addressed by the other in earnest and the linkages between them are clearly understood by both. To Pakistan, it is the problem of Kashmir. To India, it is violence in the state and other matters like Siachen, Confidence Building Measures, trade etc.

The poor, illiterate, unhealthy, shelterless, unemployed, underfed of India and Pakistan want the Vajpayee-Musharraf summit to be truly successful. It is their problem and not that of the military and civil bureaucracy, hawkish intelligentsia, sensationalist press, religious extremists and intelligence agencies whose past belligerence has prevented previous peace moves. If both countries decide to make peace and resolve all outstanding issues, including Kashmir, then resources will be diverted towards the social development of the poor instead of going to the military establishments

For both, the stakes are high. The electoral defeat of the ruling coalition in five states of India, is seen as one of the factors that has turned the heat on the Vajpayee government to show some tangible results. Musharraf faces the prospect of being put to sincerity test if he fails to convey his concerns on Kashmir. The General has already been trapped to acknowledge APHC’s proposal to meet them while in India.

The prospects are that the Agra summit will be a ‘gamble on good luck,’ the two leaders having no options except settling for something that sounds as great for India as it is for Pakistan. Much must not moreover be expected out of the first ever meeting between two leaders who had shared suspicions of each other not long ago. The pervasive pre-summit climate of scepticism, which the crystal gazers have been spotting, can indeed serve as an ideal backdrop for frank discussions by the two leaders. They share the advantage of not being called upon to answer instantly any demanding expectations from either side. In reassuring Pakistan in some way or other about the historic potential of the imminent bilateral parleys at the highest level, India can usefully combine some imaginative flexibility towards Pakistan's sensitivity with a creative firmness of diplomatic purpose. It is indeed in the larger interests of both India and Pakistan to recognise that diplomatic restraint and political candor can go together. Towards a summit of friendship (Editorial, The Hindu 21 June 2001)

A slow fox trot, which would endeavor to mortar brick on brick goes against the grain of our official thinking. But cool contemplation will counsel against rushing into the eye of the storm in its full ferocity. The institutionalisation of heads of government meetings annually will in itself diminish the power of the extremists and rejectionists everywhere. India and Pakistan sleep in the same pit of poverty — yet we dream a different dream. (M.P. Bhandara The Dawn 19 June 2001)

Besides, Kashmir will be the core issue and there is no reason why saner elements can not accept the same instead of having meaningless arguments over whether the agenda for the coming talks should be "Kashmir and other issues" or "other issues and Kashmir." Prudent statesmanship should therefore not be wasted over meaningless obsessions in putting in or keeping out this or that group in what obviously must remain beneficial bilateral engagement.

Compiled from media sources

By

Arabinda Acharya