Prospects of a War in the Sub-continent

Following December 13 terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament and by the end of the month, New Delhi moved rapidly in getting its strategic units in place followed by similar maneuvers by Islamabad. Both the countries moved their armed forces and missiles into postures of menacing confrontation across the border. Rhetoric and hysteria however fell short of full-scale engagement. More than 800,000 troops stand deployed along the borders, including the Line of Control in Kashmir There was an instant temptation to see New Delhi’s move as a facade for a psychological and diplomatic offensive. (Even as India's chief of air staff, Air Chief Marshal S Krishnaswamy was to say that "the forces deployed on the border are not for any show, but for business. If called upon, we will do what is expected of us.") The CIA Director, George Tenet, echoed the world apprehension in that the chances of a war between India and Pakistan now are the highest since 1971 and maintained that a conventional war between the two nations could escalate into a nuclear confrontation. The attention remain focused on what Islamabad was to do on India’s list of compliances and whether it’s President Musharraf, was able to translate his January 12 promises into action on the ground. Even after five months the risk of war remain precariously balanced on Musharraf’s ability and willingness to "cap, reduce and eliminate" cross border terrorism.

There has been, however, ample perception that India just cannot go to any war or even what some over jealous political enthusiasts were to urge, undertake ‘hot pursuit.’ Shimon Peres, the Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister was projecting the saner counsel that it would neither be wise nor needed for India to attack the terrorist camps based in Pakistan. "I would not dare to advise the Indian Government to do it, "even if its diplomatic offensive to fight terrorism failed." India’s postures betrayed saber rattling more than calculated war, but the risk remained that events may spin out of control and perhaps even cross the nuclear threshold. Policy errors as well as belligerent rhetoric has made most Indians contemptuous of Government especially after the evidence of what it considers double standards on the part of the international coalition against terrorism, became apparent. There is thus an expectation and demand from the domestic Indian constituency for tough action including, possibly war at any price.

This put a duty on New Delhi to respond, make itself accountable to its constituency and take steps to ensure that terrorist attacks are never repeated again. All these fall well within the realms of a country’s right of self-defence and there can not be any denying that right to India, especially as the international community was in war against terror in India’s immediate neighborhood. But the equations were different here, even distorted, the logistics vastly changed and players are almost faceless. India lacks the asymmetric military dominance of the US and Israel vis-à-vis the Taliban and Palestinians. Terrorist training camps across the LOC are not fixed installations and prone to shifting and relocation. Missiles are both expensive and ineffectual. Action against Pakistan air infrastructure risks a nuclear escalation. Any military option has the potential to unite ordinary Pakistanis with militants, as has always been the terrorists’ goal.

Besides, the campaign against the Taliban and Osama’s Al Qaida having reached a decisive phase, there was much reluctance to openly castigate Islamabad as New Delhi might have expected. Any engagement with India would force Pakistan to withdraw its troops that it stationed on its Afghan border to prevent the Taliban and Al Qaida forces escaping into Pakistan. The sub-continental engagements have also the potential to blow out as full scale wars and may even result in a nuclear flash-point given the depth of hatred the adversaries have nurtured against each other. Besides an armed engagement would have served the purpose of the terrorist well. Under pressure, due to the world attention and demolition of supply lines- monetary as well as logistics, training camps and networks, there is now a sense of desperation in the rank and file. If nothing else, they would succeed in internationalizing the Kashmir issue if a full-scale war breaks out which is bound to attract world intervention in some form or other.

Since Pokhran and Chagai Hills, the strategic compulsions of waging a conventional war between the two neighbors have changed considerably. A substantive element of strategic restraint is already inherent in the nuclear deterrence that both India and Pakistan possess. And it cannot be ignored that a heightened terror-specific war with "hot pursuit" and cross border attacks carries with it the danger of turning into a full-scale war with Pakistan. Besides, the US has its forces in Pakistan territory and its air force is using Pakistani air space for operations. It will severely jeopardize American interest if suddenly the air space is to be flooded with combating flying machines. This means that Washington will use all its influences directly as well as through its allies in persuading the sub-continental neighbors from active engagement at least till its forces are in Pakistan and it needs Pakistani air space for its own operations.

The cost of war is also self-evident. One point military option comes with risks. Neither Islamabad nor New Delhi can realistically force a decisive military victory at this time. Apart from the direct costs of the conflict, there is the cost of displacement and disruption in the conflict zones and its impact on economic growth in the long term. India would have immense difficulty justifying any action against the terrorists across the international border. Surgical air strikes across the Line of Control (Loc) in Pakistan occupied Kashmir, thought by some as viable have no utility in molding Pakistan behavior even though one does not consider conflict escalation by counter air attacks. Having occupied the moral and diplomatic high ground in Kargil by not crossing the Line of Control, it would not have been in New Delhi’s interests in the international context to resort to naked aggression. "Nations go to war when they are certain of a certain cost-benefit ratio."

If war breaks out, the considered opinion is that India has more to loose than Pakistan because of both the vulnerability of targets and the setback its economy bound to suffer. India does not possess a Blue Water navy and with only one Aircraft Carrier, its naval power projections are severely limited. Under war conditions, India has a serious problem of protecting its vital industrial establishments and other economic infrastructure and more important its trade routes not withstanding the fact that its naval capability is more sophisticated than that of Pakistan. Pakistan stands to be at a disadvantage if like the wars in 1971, India chooses to move its naval power first enough to enforce a blockade of Karachi port. Besides, world opinion led inevitably by the US will be overwhelmingly against India. And this is not counting the possibilities and consequences of a nuclear engagement. With India enjoying a strong advantage over Pakistan in both conventional and nuclear weapons, giving it an edge in its current confrontation it becomes more destabilizing for Islamabad, which then could retaliate with a nuclear strike.

There are also whole range of other options and leverages available to India in the economic, political and societal arenas that are potentially as and perhaps more effective than the military ones. For example India can breach Indus water Treaty and open the slush gates at the bottom of the 690 MW Salal Hydel Project on the Chenab River. Located some 20 km from the Indo-Pakistan border, this would result in the release of water and silt collected behind the dam, damage crops and flood thousands of hectares downstream of the Chenab in Pakistani territory. Then India can also withdraw the ‘most favored nation’ (MFN) status from Pakistan. This will give India the flexibility to impose both quantitative restrictions and penal tariff on imports from Pakistan, which will have adverse impact on bilateral trade relations.

Besides, Pakistan has started to float the perception that it has neutralized the pressure India tried to build on Islamabad by deploying troops along the borders through diplomatic and defensive strategies. "We have no aggressive designs and our troop deployment is purely in response to the Indian deployment, but we will defend every inch of our soil, in case we are attacked. Diplomatically, we have conveyed to them that war is not feasible in this part of the world where one-fifth of the humanity lives. In view of this, it is better for India to withdraw its troops instead of creating more tension in the area."

While these factors may militate against a full-scale war by India, India may still undertake surgical strikes against terrorist camps and infrastructure across the LOC, on the assumption that given the limited nature of these strikes against targets which are within Pak-occupied Kashmir (and not within internationally recognized Pakistani national territory), Pakistan will not retaliate by launching full-scale war against India outside of Kashmir. This may give the Indian government confidence that a limited Indian strike across the LOC will not escalate into full-scale war with possible use of nuclear weapons. The Indian government may calculate that while Pakistan may help the terrorist groups to resist Indian attacks and may deploy in own forces for this purpose in its part of Kashmir, Pakistan would not launch a full-scale attack on India outside of Kashmir because this would invite Indian retaliation. The same logic would prevent Pakistan from using nuclear weapons against India. This scenario assumes, however, rational cool-headed thinking on the part of the Pakistani military. But India cannot take this for granted and the Pakistani military may operate independent of its President.

Though the possibility of a formal engagement remains remote and uncertain, a number of issues engage attention of the strategic commentators. One, if there will be no war, how to bring about the redeployment. Two, if war breaks out what are the chances for the adversaries to cross the nuclear threshold and at what cost.

Disengagement:

A view has begun to emerge that the main objective of force deployment by India has been achieved and there is nothing more in prolonged mobilization. Rather India stands to gain diplomatically by announcing its intention for a phased redeployment. But the issue remains mired in controversy inside India, with the armed forces feeling that the deployment has reached a stalemate and India needs face-saving ways to try and get out of the impasse. The Ministry of external Affairs however wants full-scale deployment to continue citing "the slow throttling of Pakistan’s economy resulting from deployment, as a major gain". Facing a cash crunch, available funding for state-sponsored militancy has reduced; what percolates down to militants is definitely less. The fact that there has been no denouncement of Indian action reinforces this perception. The armed forces have reason to be apprehensive. On pure logistic terms, prolonged deployment of combat-ready troops can be counterproductive. Involving as it does a massive mobilization of arms and ammunitions, the exercise is expensive as well, at 250 million a day. The anxiety of the forces is also sustained on the fact that the short notice mobilization left many gaps in strategic preparations. The troops moved in snow and winter wears, with minimum artillery support. Changes in weather now involve additional deployment with protection against heat and dust and provision for drinking water etc. There is also a likelihood of combat fatigue setting in even before the first shot is fired for a formal war.

How does New Delhi go about disengagement? The prerequisite of the strategy of conflict avoidance is to successfully convince the adversary of the resolve and capability to wage a war that will hurt it severely. This has not been the case here with Islamabad telling itself that the countries are not on the brink of a formal war, that war is not feasible. Though it recognizes the conventional superiority of the Indian forces, it keeps its courage reasonably high with nuclear power parity. On this Pakistan is on tested ground to the extent that it has so far effectively used the nuclear dimension to neutralize India’s conventional superiority and thus dissuade it from resorting to the use of force in response to the asymmetrical war that it has been waging in Kashmir Valley. Besides there is this certain expectation that international community will be quick enough to prevent a brutal escalation and that war, even if is lost to Islamabad would certainly nullify the huge gains that have fortuitously accrued to New Delhi since September 11, in respect of India’s position vis-à-vis Pakistan. Pakistan therefore has been consistent in refusing for a unilateral withdrawal of troops and put the onus on New Delhi to de-escalate.

What exactly New Delhi can do? Does it have an alternative strategy if its explicit threat to go to war does not persuade the Pakistani leadership to deliver? The New Delhi dispensation may as well find itself in an unenviable position of witnessing its riskiest strategic maneuver ending up in a humiliating political quagmire. Having firmly and consistently rejecting third party mediation, read interference, New Delhi is not in a position to seek overt international intervention. Expecting Pakistan to relocate its occupation of the part of Kashmir, as a possible basis for negotiation is naïve enough without any moves on its own part towards even limited disengagement.

Crossing the Nuclear Threshold:

In a conflict situation, once the conventional superiority emerges against an adversary, the possibility for exercising nuclear option to prevent further escalation without waiting for international intervention becomes stronger. In south Asian context where much of security debate is premeditated by considerations of mutual hatred and religious bigotry, any event howsoever insignificant is capable of triggering an action to cross the threshold.

South Asia’s problems are unique. Geographical proximity, low level of technology in nuclear weapons program and lack of command and control system make threat assessment rather a tricky affair. In states of high alert, dispersed nuclear arsenals would require the mating of warheads with delivery systems, in which case, the potential for accidental, or, inadvertent nuclear use will inevitably increase. The danger of intentional, including pre-emptive nuclear use, could also increase because of misperception, misinformation or miscalculation. Both India and Pakistan are incapable of sustaining a prolonged conflict. Even the costs of deployment alone have long been felt. There will be a temptation to force a quick end to hostilities.

In the context of open declaration of intent by New Delhi of "no first use," it is reasonable to expect that it will be Pakistan that may first cross the nuclear threshold. India would no doubt ensure that military operations, if they become necessary, are carried out in such a way that the nuclear threshold is not reached. This was amply demonstrated in 1999 and there is no reason to doubt that successful military operations cannot be undertaken below the nuclear threshold in future. Besides, the Indian armed forces are believed to be sensitive to tolerance limits of Pakistan and are not likely to force it into a situation when it would have to consider the use of nuclear weapons. Above all, the presence of US fleet in the Arabian Sea would have been a deterrent against any possible nuclear adventurism.

Not for the first time that Islamabad has threatened to use nuclear weapons against India in the event of war. Given the asymmetry of armed forces and equipment between India and Pakistan, there is a real danger that any kind of war between the two countries can result in the use of nuclear weapons. The tenor and language of the statements emanating of late from Musharraf and his senior colleagues remind disturbingly of a jihad mindset.

In Pakistan, the development and possession of nuclear capability and doctrine and the command and control system have been exclusively in the hands of the military-intelligence establishment, with the elected political leaders of the past even when in power, having been kept totally out of the picture. Bruce Riedel, (an US National Security Council Secretariat official) was to reveal how at the height of the Kargil conflict, Clinton administration had detected initiation of action by Pervez Musharraf, then the Chief of the Army Staff, for deployment of Pakistan’s nuclear capable missiles without the authorization and even knowledge of Nawaz Sharif (Sharif was surprised when this was mentioned to him during his visit to Washington in 1999.) Besides, Pakistan’s nuclear and missile establishment has had rogue elements often not amenable to any control, either political or military.

Two possible scenarios have been visualized in the nuclear context: India’s conventional superiority with its troops reaching Lahore and its navy imposing a blockade of the Karachi port may trigger a Pakistani response with tactical nuclear weapons as a warning shot. Or under the same circumstances, Pakistan may be tempted to launch direct attack against important Indian cities. The possibilities are so obvious that India military conducted an exercise codenamed "Operation Complete Victory" to train the armed forces to operate in an "environment of chemical, biological and nuclear assault", to engage enemy aircraft "carrying a nuclear weapon" etc.

Nuclear weapons make status quo stronger as emerged out of the Kargil standoff. But the planned deployment of nuclear weapons by both the countries heightens the risks of use by accident or miscalculation. With political instability a real possibility in Pakistan, the dangers have never been so real.

Costs:

According to a World Bank assessment, the money being spent by Pakistan to maintain troops on Indo-Pak border was something it could ill afford. "Some 400,000 troops are currently on the frontier in a high state of readiness, which is presumably the main reason for the additional Rs 15 billion expected in defence spending in financial year 2002," the Bank said in a new report on Pakistan. "This is a sum that Pakistan with its debt problems and unfulfilled social needs can ill afford. There are severe risks arising from Pakistan's strained relations with its large neighbor India. At its worst, the Kashmir crisis could end in a nuclear exchange that would wreak enormous physical and economic devastation in both India and Pakistan." On its own Islamabad admits that a mass deployment of troops had caused an over-run in defence spending and hit its economy. (Pakistan’s Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz, told a Pakistan Development Forum (PDF) meeting in Paris)

On the Indian side there are estimates that Crop worth Rs 14.3 million were damaged due to Army activity along border areas of Jaisalmer in Rajasthan though exact amount could not be ascertained due to extensive mining of the areas. Besides roads measuring 730 kilometers were damaged due to movement of army vehicles and the loss was estimated to be over Rs 8.2 million. The Government has arranged for payment of compensation, which adds to the costs of prolonged mobilization.

The human and social costs of conflict especially if there will be a war and if nuclear weapons will be used can only be left to the imagination. But the balance sheet shall be that neither will emerge a gainer.

By

Arabinda Acharya, Research Coordinator

Centre for Peace and Development Studies, India.