Sri Lanka: On a Dangerous Precipice?

In a 'constitutional coup' of sorts that surprised many observers worldwide, Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga sacked Prime Minister Wickramasinghe's defence, interior and media ministers, in a move that is being seen as meant to derail the negotiations with the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Elam (LTTE) for a possible solution to Island nation's decades old ethnic imbroglio. She suspended the national Parliament and declared a state of emergency, thereby arming herself with sweeping authority. The President was apparently provoked by the November 1 proposal from the Tamil Tigers on power sharing arrangement in the Northeastern province. While for the President, he proposal is quite unacceptable, the negotiators saw in it a basis for reviving the Norway brokered peace talks which was stalled since April this year.

The immediate concern is about the fate of the fragile peace process, which for months appeared to be the single most positive development on the terrorism front in South Asia. The President Kumaratunga says that she remains committed to the peace process, that the ceasefire agreement signed between the LTTE and Prime Minister Wickramasinghe stands and that there is no intention to provoke a resumption of hostilities. The Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe who was on a visit abroad including in the United States when the crisis unfolded hopes that the Tigers will not revert to war again. But the political feud within the government would at the least put negotiations on hold indefinitely. Dangerously the Tamils may find that 'Singhalese are hopelessly divided,' thus may withdraw from the talks altogether and resume violence that has claimed more than 64000 lives so far.

Over the years several attempts have failed to solve the civil war in the Northeastern province on the issue of a separate homeland for the Tamils. The latest effort brokered by Norwegian diplomats seemed more promising than the previous ones so much so that there has been considerable international patronage including commitment of substantial financial assistance to rebuild the country ravaged by violence and bloodshed. Since February 2002, as the ceasefire held, the country witnessed welcoming change from the climate of fear and violence, while both sides inched towards a political settlement. Notably, for the first time, the LTTE dropped their demands for a separate Tamil homeland. Skepticisms about the process notwithstanding, many believed that there is now at least a fair chance of achieving a peaceful settlement.

To an outside observer, the developments appear to be having a more complicated and perhaps a personal edge than being about what the President Kumartunga termed 'too much concessions to the Tamils,' and 'deterioration of the security situation.' From the beginning the President and Prime Minister representing different political parties have rarely been in agreement about the course and contours of the negotiations with the Tamil rebels. The President, a victim of Tigers' atrocities herself, has repeatedly voiced her displeasure about being kept in the dark by the negotiators. She thought that the Norwegian peace monitors are biased towards the Tigers and even demanded sacking of the head of the delegation on charges of breach of secrecy that let the LTTE escape with an arms consignment. Kumartunga, who would have expected the rebels to surrender their weapons as a proof of their peace intentions rather thought that Tigers used the ceasefire to rearm and recruit. On the other hand, the Prime Minister has been complaining about what he thinks President's attempt to undermine him and his government and even publicly warned the President not to antagonize the Scandinavians. He has termed President's current actions as irresponsible and precipitous', a desperate attempt 'to undermine the peace process,' aimed 'at plunging the country into chaos and anarchy.'

The present crisis is full of uncertainties especially as all sides are on precarious balance. For the President, her moves could prove to be double-edged. If she dissolves the Parliament and calls for fresh elections, chances are that the Prime Minister may end up gaining in strength using his arguments that Kumartunga is undermining the peace process for personal ends. Contrarily, her actions might succeed in dividing the Singhalese to an extent that it would become almost impossible for the government to reopen negotiations. On the positive side, as some observers argue, if she takes charge of defence now, she can remain more engaged in the peace process and thereby can avoid a military confrontation.

The timing of the President's moves could earn international support for the Prime Minister. Washington has given the peace process it's backing and expects that in a democratic set up, public officials need to work together in the public interest. The EU and especially Japan-one of the biggest potential donors are concerned that Sri Lanka, which was never 'this close to a settlement' faces a 'make or break' prospect. But much of his success will be contingent upon the support that Wickremesinghe gets for his policy domestically, especially from the military establishment. Military, though divided along party lines is extremely concerned about LTTE activities during the peace period. Meanwhile, the average Singhalese remain wary of any resumption of violence and the fear that the country may eventually be divided. Though the cross section of the public is not 'anti-peace,' there is concern about the 'peace at any cost.'

For the Tigers, as they wait and watch the developments, the implications could largely be an open one. Post 9/11 developments have put the LTTE and its cause out of the receiving end of international empathy. With the sources of its supply and financing squeezed, the Tigers' only claim to legitimacy was the February 2002 ceasefire agreement, a status that they can jettison only at great costs to themselves. Many in the rebel ranks were also looking forward to peace, for them the 'beginning of the end' took a 'long long time in coming.' But the Tigers have also a history of backtracking on agreements and have much blood in their hands every time they have done so as with Indian peacekeeping experiment in the late eighties. This time around, the opportunity was being offered to them on a platter. As many reports suggest, the LTTE has used the hiatus in hostilities to rearm and regroup better. It has now reportedly asked its cadre to vacate government areas in the north and the east, a move that could be construed as war preparedness. Though the LTTE do not match the Sri Lankan military in force, the military has not been able to keep the Tigers at bay either. The Tigers have a 'pathological hatred' for Kumartunga and likely to find her actions just the excuse to break up the negotiations for good. Alternatively, they may choose to wait and watch and eventually may get relieved of the burden of proof for the breakdown of the negotiations and may probably use this to justify a revival of the demand for separate homeland.

In Sri Lanka, impasse and fatigue now go hand in hand. The present crisis has all the destabilizing potentials to bring all the sides into a dangerous precipice again and thus portends good for none.

Compiled from media sources

By

Arabinda Acharya

Research Analyst, IDSS political Violence and Terrorism Programme and BHATIYA SANJAYA COLONNE, Masters Student in Strategic Studies, IDSS.