Going Beyond Agra

In the history of the sub-continent few events probably generated as much interest as the summit talks between the Indian Prime Minister and President Musharraf of Pakistan. The media made it possible that the interest both before and during the event remain focussed with live telecast, continuous analyses etc. Naturally, there was a surfeit of predictions/speculations about the outcome of the Vajpayee-Musharraf summit talks. Put together, the speculations ran along the following broad lines

- That the summit will at best produce a declaration or a joint statement which would be acceptable to both the leaders sans any contentious issues given the compulsions under which the talks are being held. (This is in the context that Musharraf particularly would have liked a declaration from Agra that would have overruled the Lahore initiative of which the General did not have much liking).

- That New Delhi runs the risks of being blamed for any failure if the summit does not come out with any tangible results. (This was obvious from the amount of hype that the General turned President created to mislead independent observers into believing that it is entirely due to New Delhi’s persistent refusal to accept Kashmir issue as an agenda for discussions.)

The outcome was partial. As Musharraf made the retreat without even formal send offs that protocol demanded, it was becoming clear that the subcontinent’s congenital warring neighbours once again fell victim to the contentious issue around Kashmir an issue which President Musharraf carried from Islamabad and Prime Minister Vajpayee choose to keep in some sort of political amnesia.

President Musharraf gave all the indications of having done his homework well. From the beginning he has been maintaining that Kashmir is the core issue and any discussion devoid of Kashmir problem shall be eyewash at best. Objectively analyzed, this appeared to be right at least from Pakistan’s viewpoint.

Kashmir has been a congenital policy dilemma for Pakistani leadership since 1947 . The issue has been determining the contour of Indo-Pak relations. There have been formal wars with India over it, continuous border skirmishes and subversive terrorist activities around it. Even when the both the leaders were breaking their heads in trying to find a common ground to discuss at Agra there were reports of cross border firing on the line of control. The Kashmir imbroglio has also been responsible for sub-continental nuclear adventure with both the countries spending huge sums on building up deterrent capacity for themselves - both conventional and nuclear. The money other wise could have been made available for development projects which both the countries badly require given the poor and underdeveloped economy.

Kashmir has also been the central to international community’s perceptions about both the nations. Ever since the UN’s resolution on Kashmir, the topic has come up with certain regularity in statements of various heads of government and statesmen to the region.

Most important, however has been the fact that Pakistan’s history of military governments was the product of issues that center on Kashmir. It has always been the topic to keep the military happy even by civilian rulers like the Bhuttos, Nawaj Shariff and the like.

It was against this background that President Musharraf tried to build up a hype around Kashmir issue. "Pakistan and India should set a direction and time frame for resolving their decades-old dispute in forthcoming talks over the Himalayan region of Kashmir, a dangerous flash-point between the nuclear foes….. he said he was determined not to let other issues distract from efforts to resolve the dispute over Kashmir, which has ignited two wars between the South Asian rivals." (The Hindustan Times 5 July 2001)

Musharraf was being pragmatic in his statement that religion and politics cannot go hand in gloves and that irresponsible anti India tirade has led the international community into dubbing Pakistan a terrorist or even a failed state. ("Because of irresponsible statements and actions by irresponsible leaders, Pakistan is now being dubbed a terrorism-sponsoring country," Musharraf said at a religious conference attended by hard-line Islamic clerics.)

But this also made it evident that the organizations working for the Kashmir cause are under some form of control by Islamabad. The Musharraf warning to the organizations and the advise that they must exercise restraint prior to his Agra sojourn can also be interpreted in terms of some hidden agenda that the military ruler has with the organizations operating from both sides of the border. Even though there had been expressions of strong sentimentality about Musharraf negotiating on independence to Kashmir ( by Pakistan's influential Islamic clerics "granting independence to Kashmir was not the lasting answer to the problem" PTI, The Times of India 1 July 2001) or apprehensions that Pakistan stands prepared to accept a division of Kashmir. "Pakistan is smoothing the way for Kashmir's division as a solution," Zafar Khan, head of diplomatic affairs of the JKLF’s British chapter told newsmen. Such a solution would be unacceptable to the JKLF, he added. "The JKLF has come to this conclusion because of the way president Pervez Musharraf had consulted Kashmiri representatives preparatory to his forthcoming talks with Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in Agra," (The Hindustan Times 6 July 2001)

Musharraf was also being practical when he stated that in Pakistan only a military regime could enforce any sort commitment with India. For the moment, Musharraf appeared to be the right man in Pakistan to start a dialogue.

Thus before coming for the talks, Pakistan’s new President made it clear that he was coming to negotiate with constructional sanctity, (getting himself sworn in as the President), has got the backing of the army, was going to talk about (Kashmir) the things that people in Pakistan want discussed, the opposition included and that he created the most conducive atmosphere for the talks (keeping the militant organizations on lease). It therefore did not come as a surprise when he opened his mind before the press, putting New Delhi in a spot on Kashmir issue. What can be more near the truth (for Musharraf) than the statement that if he does not talk about Kashmir, it’s as well better for him to buy back his ancestral home in old Delhi and settle down in India?

Strange as it may appear, New Delhi’s continuous reactions to Kashmir issue being a point of discussion was stoic silence expect to the extent that Prime Minister Vajpayee said that he is prepared to discuss any issue whatsoever. But this appeared at first as diplomatic tongue twist or political hypocrisy. Other wise the issue would not have been avoided consistently, including in the speech of Indian President at the dinner reception. This also explained the narrow-mindedness that New Delhi displayed in playing down importance of the tea party meeting with Hurriyat leaders. To expect that an agreement if any can be acceptable without the consent of the representative elements of the parties to the dispute is naïve enough. Sadly moreover, no one is as yet sure who represents the popular sentiment in Kashmir.

Even among the groups actively pursuing the Kashmir cause including the militant outfits there could not be any anonymity on who to represent the interests of the Kashmiries and this became evident as the summit approached. Launching a tirade against the All-Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC), the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) charged the 23-party conglomerate with having "bargained with Pakistan all the sacrifices" made by the Kashmiri people for independence. "The Hurriyat conference is nothing but an extension of Pakistani regime in Srinagar. They have been only parrots --- narrating what their masters in Islamabad have wanted," JKLF General Secretary and Quami Mushawarti Council Convenor Haider Hijaji said. "We are not scapegoats for the national interest of Pakistan as projected by the seven jokers of the amalgam," Hijaji said referring to the seven executive members of the Hurriyat Conference. He said the JKLF, under the leadership of Ammanullah Khan, had been always aware of Pakistan's nefarious designs, which have been very critical towards even the basic rights of Kashmiris. "The rejection of JKLF candidates in the farce of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, elections is a naked example of this tendency from the Islamabad regime," he said (The Pioneer 5 July 2001.) Wilson John echoed the sentiments of the people of Kashmir demanding for a report card. "What have it done for the State in the last eight years of its existence? The old men have called strikes and bandhs at the drop of their toupees. They have instigated people to take to the streets to support terrorists and their cause. The valley has been shut down when terrorists were flushed out of mosques. The Hurriyat said the terrorists should have been allowed to walk out free. They had gone merely to pray. With guns, Mr Abdul Ghani Bhatt? …..Why don't you call for a strike when ordinary people of the State go without electricity for days and weeks together in the dead of the winter? Gherao the Chief Minister. Block his cavalcade. Demand power. But that's not what the master controller in Islamabad wants, right Mr Bhatt?... Besides lack of commitment and unity, another serious problem plaguing the Hurriyat is the absence of popular leadership. None of the present lot of leaders has a mass appeal.... So when we talk of the Hurriyat, we are really talking about not more than half-a-dozen people whose collective support base would not exceed much beyond the boundaries of Srinagar. India, for once, has been right in dismissing Musharraf's invitation to the Hurriyat as a non-issue. It is. The Hurriyat is a group of bit players desperately in search of a credible script. Kashmir is just a prop for them." This was probably the reason behind New Delhi’s marked reluctance in accepting Hurriyat as the representative group to have dialogue with when the Indian Prime Minister announced cease-fire and opened the doors for negotiations.

{AHPC however had its side of the argument ready, its Chairman telling that "no Hurriyat, no sincerity". "This is not the first time that bilateral talks are being held between India and Pakistan. They have been taking place in the past as well, with similar media hype and have often ended without any progressive or constructive content. A major portion of the time and scarce resources of each country are used to put each other down and, now they want us to believe that, overnight they have developed pangs of sincerity and want to change history. The exclusion of the Hurriyat from the talks is an indicator of lack of sincerity in any resolve to solve the issue. The Government of India should understand that Gen. Musharraf needs an explicit Hurriyat endorsement in order to sell any peace package, back home. A sincere effort for the resolution of the Kashmir issue will take the Kashmiri route. If you want to change history within or outside the stated positions, the Kashmiris will have to be the integral part of any such effort. They are the basic party and any solution acceptable to them will have to be accepted by the secondary parties." (The Hindu 13 July 2001)}

But this did not exonerate India in having failed to put in place a definite policy initiative. Even three decades of Simla Agreement could not give New Delhi time enough to resolve the core problems that made Kashmir an issue. Islamabad was to take hold of such ineptitude for propagonda campaign at the least. It was in this back ground that expectations were raised for the summit to produce something concrete as against being used by the two leaders to play to their respective domestic constituencies. "Peoples in both countries want an end to the Kashmir crisis. In any kind of negotiations, there is a minimum threshold below which one cannot settle. Is even our minimum going to be acceptable to Pakistan? And vice versa? It is doubtful unless Musharraf is prepared to consider something centred on the LoC. Regardless of the outcome, however, we must keep talking. A breakthrough may appear in the form of a permanent bilateral ministerial committee. We must come to an agreement aimed at reducing to the extent possible risks of a nuclear war. We could agree to keep the LoC 'cool' (as has been done on the Sino-Indian border), remove restrictions and go ahead with improving and expanding exchanges in the economic, cultural and social fields." (Romesh Bhandari The Hindustan Times 5 July 2001).

On the Indian side, the think tank was unanimous as to the points that, Pakistan’s entry into Kashmir issue will make it more complicated. . Once the process of negotiation with Pakistan gets under way, the alternative of settling the issue domestically can be taken to be as good as given up. Besides, Pakistan will not be satisfied with any solution which does not lead to an eventual secession of the State to Pakistan on the basis of religion. (Muchkund Dubey The Hindu 11 July 2001). Besides once New Delhi grants entry to Islamabad on Kashmir, other outside powers are sure to envision interest and India ultimately may find what it has been considering its domestic troubles getting internationalised. Any solution to the Kashmir problem must be consistent with India's national ethos of democracy and secularism and must not undermine its territorial integrity and unity.

When President Musharraf referred to Kashmir being the core issue he did not count the State as it existed on 15th August 1947. Moreover, a discussion on the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir must involve the rights of the people of the State - their political, cultural and economic rights. The point that must not be lost sight of is that the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir is a legal and a constitutional entity consolidated and recognised by the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir as well as the Constitution of India. The territorial boundaries defined by the law and the Constitution are not negotiable (Riyaz Punjabi). The Hindu 12 July 2000. It was also argued that the task for Mr. Vajpayee and Gen. Musharraf is to identify all the stakeholders in the peace process and, as a further step, devise an institutionalised mechanism to solicit their opinion and hold a public dialogue in their respective constituencies to take their voices into account. The negotiators must accept the plurality of the State of Jammu & Kashmir (on the Indian side at least), which, besides the Kashmiri Muslims-in-majority, has diverse communities such as Gujjars, Bakkarwals, Kashmiri Pandits, Dogras and Ladakhi Buddhists for whom the right of self- determination has little appeal. Besides Areas in so called Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas (erstwhile Gilgit and Baltistan), under Pakistan's control, must have been on the negotiating agenda. Azad Kashmir is azad only in nomenclature. Its status has never been defined in normal international legal terms by the Azad Kashmir or Pakistan Governments or the United Nations. And the parties to the conflict are not Kashmiris (read Kashmiri Muslims) alone but all the communities living in the erstwhile Dogra State of Jammu and Kashmir (as specified in the much maligned/championed UN resolutions). More over the bilateral negotiating process on Kashmir needs to be disentangled from its historical and ideological baggage. It needs to be de-ideologised and delinked from the respective countries' nationalist discourse that "Pakistan is incomplete without Kashmir'' or that "Kashmir is the crown-symbol of Indian secularism''..... The challenge, in the long run, lies in delinking the principle of self-determination from the territorial issue at stake and according political space to the people of Jammu & Kashmir for shaping their political future, without necessarily changing the borders. (Navnita Chadha Behera, The Hindu 12 July 2001)

It is therefore correct on the part of New Delhi to have sighied away from the Kashmir issue even though the otherside was making much hue and cry over it. What India must have wanted was that there were other equally pressing matters such as terrorism and cross border terrorism to be discussed. It came as no surprise that India rejected Pakistan's demand for plebiscite in Kashmir and asserted that it would strongly take up the issue of cross-border terrorism and the revival of the composite dialogue process with Islamabad at the Agra summit. "The question of referendum simply does not arise," Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh said , adding that even UN Secretary General had stated that the UN resolution of 1948 in this respect was not enforceable. Making it clear that India was not afraid or shy of discussing Kashmir with Pakistan, he said it was not the "core" issue." (The Hindustan Times 13 July 2001)

Thus the Agra negotiations, predictably failed to achieve even the least expected result . The President made a hasty but dramatic retreat giving all the appearance of a man disappointed. His diplomats castigated New Delhi’s approach and blamed a rather hard line stand for the failure even to come up with a joint statement. The Kashmir separatists have already joined the chorus though the All Party Hurriyat Conference displayed responsibility in reacting to the events. (In a statement the organization has blamed the rigidity of both the sides for the impasse and expressed the hope that future negotiation for which Agra summit is the precursor will be more positive and flexible)

This is where the diplomatic silence comes to the rescue of India. The pre-summit commotion that President Musharraf created might have succeeded in getting some to believe that India is to be blamed. But as the dusts settle down on Taj Mahal, it will soon be realized that New Delhi did nothing except sticking to its point that the issue of cross border terrorism comes first before the issue of Kashmir howsoever old it might have been. It’s politically axiomatic that New Delhi’s democratic governance has perceived the changing importance of issues. Terrorism now has become a factor that is related not only to Kashmir, but also to Punjab, the North East, it has threatened the internal security of the country, posed serious problems to its economy and trade, and endangered the civic life in India. If the insistence on some firm commitment from Musharraf has put off the tenor of the summit, it is but for the better. Truth triumphs in the end and if New Delhi can convince the international community that its rigidity is all about talking to Musharraf on terrorism, then it is in the right path.

There is atleast one aspect that made the meeting relevant that it must be used as a beginning for more such negotiations. Both the sides have been displaying constraint in not going for political or diplomatic witch hunting on the negative outcome. Both sides have kept the doors open for further progress in this matter. Even President Musharraf refused to be drawn into a debate on the outcome of the summit even though he would have liked have come back with a declaration of sorts. He did not blame any body even though there were sufficient provocations for the same. By now he has extended his invitations to the Indian Prime Minister for talks in Islamabad. The road to peace is now open, and must be pursued. Though the terrorist attacks have been stepped up in the Valley, these are to expected and dealt with. It will be naïve to believe that stray incidents of violence can distract the determination of sovereign nations. Both sides must address internal factors and get prepared for negotiations. Commentators advise that India must seriously consider granting autonomy to the State of Jammu and Kashmir to garner popular mandate for negotiating with Pakistan. This will also drive the terrorist cause to bankruptcy. President Musharraf must keep his control over the Jeehadi organisations operating from his side of the border to make the atmosphere more conducive.

Compiled from media sources

By

Arabinda Acharya